A NEW ARCHITECTURE WITHOUT THE MAJORITY

THE LEADERS SHOULD WEAR SACKCLOTH AND ASHES AND GO THERE WITH A HEAVY HEART.........Maynard Keynes before the first Bretton Woods

IT IS tempting to dismiss the upcoming G20 meeting as a piece of political theatre. Presidents and prime ministers from a score of rich and emerging economies will descend on Washington, DC, ostensibly to remake the rules of global finance. Several have talked grandly of a sequel to the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, which created the post-war system of fixed exchange rates and established the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. That is nonsense. The original Bretton Woods lasted three weeks and was preceded by more than two years of technical preparation. Today’s crisis may be the gravest since the Depression, but global finance will not be remade in a five-hour powwow hosted by a lame-duck president after less preparation than many corporate board meetings. Yet for three reasons it is still a meeting worth having.

The first is that this could mark the beginning of a better multilateral economic system. The G20, created after the emerging-market crises a decade ago, is not perfect for today’s problems. It excludes a big economy with an admired system of financial regulation (Spain) but includes a mid-sized country that has become irrelevant to global finance because of its own mismanagement (Argentina). Still, the G20 includes most of the key parts of the rich and emerging world, making it a better forum for global economic co-operation than the G7 group of rich countries, which has until now held the stage.

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Don’t just stand there

In the short term that co-operation, and this weekend’s meeting, should focus on the second good reason for the Washington summit: crisis management. Although the panic in the credit markets shows signs of abating, the economic news gets ever grimmer. Global demand is slumping as rich economies plunge into what, collectively, could be their deepest recession since the 1930s. Pernicious deflation, though still unlikely, is no longer an idle risk. Emerging economies are being hit hard by weakening exports and the collapse of private capital flows. The G20 summiteers cannot prevent this, but they can stave off a slump with zealous and co-ordinated action to prop up domestic demand and provide resources to cash-strapped emerging economies.

Some countries understand the urgency. China’s stimulus plan, even if it is a little less dramatic than first trumpeted, is an important step . Others, such as Germany, are being woefully timid. A collective commitment by those who can afford it will pack more punch than individual initiatives. Useful too, would be a pledge to cushion the slump in private capital flows to emerging economies, through both central-bank swap lines and the IMF. Countries with ample reserves, particularly China, Japan and the oil exporters, should promise now, and without preconditions, that they will lend to the IMF if it needs cash in the coming months. The G20 should also pledge its unequivocal support for free trade—a pledge that would gain credence if the leaders made a commitment to complete the Doha round of trade talks.

But what of the larger ambitions of “fixing” global finance? Here the temptation for hollow promises is greatest of all. The summiteers can make progress, but only if they temper their hyperbole with realism and humility.

International finance cannot just be “fixed”, because the system is a tug-of-war between the global capital markets and national sovereignty. As cross-border financial flows have expanded and big financial institutions have far outgrown their domestic markets, finance has become one of the most globalised parts of the world economy. At the same time, finance is inherently unstable, so the state has to play a big role in making it safer by lending in a crisis in return for regulation and oversight. Governments broadly welcome the benefits of global finance, yet they are not prepared to set up either a global financial regulator, which would interfere deep inside their markets, or a global lender of last resort. Instead, regulated financial firms are overseen by disparate national supervisors (in America they are sometimes state-based). The IMF helps cash-strapped countries, but the fund was conceived in an era when capital flows were restrained. It is puny relative to the size of global markets today.

This tug-of-war helped create today’s mess. Disparate rules led to loopholes and “regulatory arbitrage”. Many emerging economies sought to protect themselves against sudden outflows of foreign capital by building up vast foreign-exchange reserves. That fuelled the global credit bubble. Given today’s crisis, the incentives to amass reserves have only grown.

The contradictory desires for national sovereignty and global capital markets limit the room for an overhaul. For all the grand rhetoric, no politician is proposing to cede sovereignty to a global regulator, let alone create a true global lender of last resort. Nor is anyone proposing a wholesale effort to curb capital flows (which is just as well). With no great design on the drawing board, it is better to concentrate on the more modest goal of improving the current muddled contraption through a series of politically feasible enhancements that together could amount to a third justification for this meeting.

Refit the existing engine

One example is Gordon Brown’s idea of a “college of supervisors” to oversee the biggest financial firms. Another is a global set of norms on what should be regulated and how: from hedge funds to leverage limits, national regulators would do a better job if they acted in concert. By all means start to look at schemes to revamp the IMF by scaling back Europe’s presence and enhancing emerging economies’ clout. But it would be a mistake to rely only on the IMF. The Fed’s new swap lines with other central banks are an important reassurance for countries that face a liquidity squeeze; those swap lines deserve to be systematised and broadened.

Modest as they sound, such repairs will be difficult and time-consuming. This summit should get them off to a start. It won’t earn anyone a place in the history books alongside John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. But it would be a lot more useful than more gusts of grandiose rhetoric.

ANOTHER BRETTON WOODS

..... More winners this time?

AFRICA WILL NOT BE THERE BUT WE WILL BEAR THE BRUNT

This weekend President Bush will host an economic summit of the G-20 nations. This summit has been compared to the conference at Bretton Woods, NH that convened in 1944 to rebuild the global financial system after WWII. Unfortunately, the most important reform to come out of that conference so long ago does not appear to be on the agenda of this latest version.

The original Bretton Woods conference was convened primarily to structure the monetary system that would prevail after the war. The desire for a stable monetary system grew out of the experience of the 1930s competitive devaluations and high trade tariffs. Many at the time rightly came to associate these devaluations and high tariffs with war. Freer trade and a stable monetary system were associated with peace.

The result of the first Bretton Woods conference was a system that pegged the US dollar to gold with the other major currencies pegged to the dollar. This system, while having many flaws, was a source of economic stability for 26 years. Other periods of fixed exchange rates (primarily fixed to gold) also produced more stable economic systems than floating rate regimes. This stability can be observed in the low volatility of commodity prices during the fixed periods. During the period of the pure gold standard from 1880-1913 (when the Federal Reserve was established) the standard deviation of commodity prices was roughly 4.5. During the free float period from 1914-1926 the standard deviation at least doubled (there are differences depending on which commodity index is used). During the Bretton Woods era from 1945 to 1971 commodity price volatility was reduced again to a standard deviation of about 8. Since 1971 volatility has again risen to about 15.

If the goal is more stability in the economic system, this new conference must begin to address the exchange rate system. Reducing the volatility of exchange rates and therefore commodity prices is essential to reducing the risk associated with international trade. Billions of dollars have been lost over the last few months alone by companies attempting, unsuccessfully, to hedge exchange rate and commodity price risk. UAL reported a $544 million loss from fuel hedges gone wrong. Citic Pacific Ltd. Lost $1.9 billion from hedging activities related to the Australian dollar. Northwest Airlines took a $410 million write down from losses on fuel hedges. Verasun lost $100 million from hedging the price of corn and ultimately filed bankruptcy. Sadia, Brazil’s second largest food company posted a $410 million loss from currency hedging activities and had their credit rating downgraded. While some of these losses were due to actions outside company hedging policies, they wouldn’t have happened if the need to hedge were eliminated or reduced.

Expectations for the conference are being downplayed and the goals minimized with the strengthening of the IMF seemingly the only concrete expectation. Most of the participant countries seem more interested in regulatory reform and that is certainly necessary and desirable. Even during the stable periods previously mentioned, there were banking crises here in the US. Even in a stable monetary environment, fractional reserve banking has the potential to destabilize. Based on recent experience with leverage, one would think that increasing bank capital requirements is one item that could be agreed upon. Other ideas, such as closer supervision of hedge funds and credit rating agencies, may not be necessary if monetary reform and banking reform are properly addressed.

The global imbalances much discussed over the last few years are exactly what the IMF was designed to address. When the IMF was founded along with the World Bank, the first Bretton Woods conference placed them in the context of a stable monetary system. Reforming the IMF without reforming the monetary system will not yield a more stable system. We would have to depend on the IMF not only to anticipate problems but also to act on them in a politically charged environment. The performance of the IMF since the fall of the first Bretton Woods agreement suggests that is too much to ask.

Monetary reform will not be easy. China and most of the emerging Asian economies will fight hard to maintain a currency advantage that they see as vital to the growth of exports that have fueled their past growth. The US will be reluctant to agree to a system that weakens the role of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. The Europeans will press for a greater role for the Euro in international trade. These three currency blocs will all have their own agendas but the current global economic slowdown may be the perfect opportunity to address the issue of monetary reform. Global economic cooperation is no longer optional; this crisis has affected every region of the world.

Over the last 60 years we have witnessed a movement toward freer trade, freer markets and freer movement of capital that has raised living standards around the world. That movement accelerated over the last 30 years and the reduction in world wide poverty during that period is nothing short of astounding. It is critical that we construct a global monetary system that provides a stable structure within which we can extend this record and realize the full benefits of the free market.